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Abstract— This research proposes a novel auction mechanism 
for transactive energy exchange between buyers and sellers, 
modeled as agents in a microgrid. The mechanism is 
implemented by a separate microgrid controller (MC) agent, and 
requires big data flow with the other agents through an iterative 
bidding process. Although private user information remains 
hidden to the MC, a theoretical analysis shows that under the 
assumption of convexity of the agents’ utilities, the proposed 
auction is still able to maximize the social welfare (SW), i.e. the 
aggregate utilities of the agents. In addition, it is shown that the 
mechanism exhibits the key desirable features of individual 
rationality and weak budget balance; guaranteeing that neither 
the payoff to any agent nor the net monetary revenue after 
termination, is negative. The proposed approach also 
incorporates a mechanism to redistribute the sellers’ shares in a 
fair manner. As an example, a maximum entropy based fair 
redistribution scheme is addressed. The theoretical analysis 
reported here is accompanied by extensive set of simulations that 
illustrate the various aspects of the proposed mechanism.  
 
Index Terms—microgrid; agents; trading; auction; bid; social 
welfare, fairness 
         NOMENCLATURE 
 
𝒟    Set of buyer agents 
𝒮    Set of seller agents 
𝑁𝑏      Number of buyer agents, where 𝑁𝑏 = |𝒟| 
𝑁𝑠      Number of seller agents, where 𝑁𝑠 = |𝒮| 
𝑖    Index of a buyer, where 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟 
𝑗    Index of a seller, where 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮 
𝑢𝑖    Utility function of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  buyer 
𝑢𝑖
′    Marginal utility of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  buyer 
𝑔𝑗   Generation capacity of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ seller 
𝑣𝑗    Utility function of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ   seller 
𝑣𝑗
′    Marginal utility of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ   seller 
𝑑𝑖    Demand delivered to the 𝑖th buyer 
𝑏𝑖    Buying price bid placed by the 𝑖th buyer 
𝑐𝑖    Buying per unit price payed by the 𝑖th buyer 
𝑎𝑗    Availability declared by 𝑗th seller 
𝑠𝑗    Supply amount assigned to the 𝑗th seller 
𝑐𝑗    Minimum per unit selling price by the 𝑗th seller 
𝑝    The minimum per unit buying and maximum per unit 
          selling price of energy 
Θ    SW optimization problem (SWOP) objective function 
ℒΘ   Lagrangian of the SWOP  
𝜆𝑖       Dual variable in ℒΘ, corresponding to 𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖  
𝛼𝑗       Dual variable in ℒΘ, corresponding to 𝑠𝑗 < 𝑎𝑗 
𝜇        Dual variable in ℒΘ, corresponding to ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖∈𝒟 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗∈𝒮  
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𝑑𝑖
∗   𝑑𝑖  at equilibrium as the efficient solution of the SWOP 
𝑠𝑗
∗    𝑠𝑗 at equilibrium as the efficient solution of the SWOP 
𝜆𝑖
∗       𝜆𝑖  at equilibrium in the SWOP 
𝛼𝑗
∗      𝛼𝑗 at equilibrium in the SWOP 
𝜇∗       𝜇 at equilibrium in the SWOP 
Φ     MC optimization problem (MCOP) objective function 
ℒΦ      Lagrangian of the MCOP 
𝛾𝑖        Dual variable in ℒΦ, corresponding to 𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖  
𝛽𝑗       Dual variable in ℒΦ, corresponding to 𝑠𝑗 < 𝑎𝑗 
𝜈        Dual variable in ℒΦ, corresponding to ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖∈𝒟 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑗∈𝒮  
𝑑𝑖
†    𝑑𝑖  at equilibrium as the solution of the MCOP 
𝑠𝑗
†    𝑠𝑗  at equilibrium as the solution of the MCOP 
𝛾𝑖
†       𝛾𝑖 at equilibrium in the MCOP 
𝛽𝑗
†       𝛽𝑗  at equilibrium in the MCOP 
𝜈†       𝜈  at equilibrium in the MCOP 
𝜁      Dual variable of constraint 𝑠𝑗 ≥ 0 in seller’s problem 
𝜋𝑖        Buyers payoff from the auction 
𝜋𝑗        Sellers payoff from the auction 
𝜋𝑀𝑀     Microgrid controllers’ benefit 
𝐹         Fairness term function 
𝜂         Fairness term coefficient 
ℒWF    Lagrangian of the FROP 
𝑠𝑗
𝑟     The sellers’ redistributed supply 
𝑆     Sum of the redistributed supply of all sellers 
𝑅        Total sellers’ revenue 
𝑐𝑗
𝑟        The sellers’ redistributed selling price 
𝛽𝑗
𝑟       Dual variable in ℒWF for 𝑠𝑗𝑟 ≤ 𝑎𝑗 
𝜈𝑟        Dual variable in ℒWF for ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑟 = 𝑆𝑗∈𝒮  
𝐾     Solution constant for the FROP 
𝜅𝐹       Price of fairness  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE advent of alternative energy sources is causing a 
paradigm change in the operation of the energy grid [1]. It 
has shifted the generation of electricity away from a few large 
power plants towards several smaller individual units that are 
equipped with PV panels and other means to produce 
electricity from renewable sources. Although at present this 
energy is typically utilized to meet the individual units’ own 
energy needs, it is envisaged that with greater penetration of 
PV-equipped homes in future, along with the development of 
more efficient solar panels, individual homes would be able to 
deliver energy to the grid [2]. Being positioned closer to other 
consumer units, these PV-equipped units are better placed to 
supply energy to the latter during exigent situations [3]. 
Complete isolation of a microgrid is an extreme example of 
such a case. Under these circumstances, the microgrid should 
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allow bidirectional energy transactions between the units in 
the form of an auction mechanism that allows the buying and 
selling of electricity. 
A. Background 
Advances in communications and networking have made 
automated energy transactions via the grid feasible [1]. 
Consequently energy trading and grid auction design has been 
the subject of considerable recent research. Due to the 
complex nature of the problem, some recent work has focused 
on the application of nature inspired metaheuristics [4]-
[10].Genetic algorithms, swarm intelligence, and hybrid 
approaches are popular choices for such applications [11].  
Linear programming is another popular choice of algorithm. 
Discrete variables are handled either by means of tree-based 
search or relaxing and treating them as continuous ones. 
Unfortunately these approaches entail the assumption of 
linearity and might not be the ideal choice of many grid 
auctions [12]-[13].  
Approaches for supply side auctions between power 
generation companies to sell energy at competitive prices have 
been the subject of much recent research [14]-[22]. Typically 
these approaches address generation scheduling and unit 
commitment whose treatment involves discrete design 
variables. Consequently, mixed integer linear programming 
has been extensively applied in such studies 
[15],[19],[22],[23].A two-stage bidding approach between the 
generation companies and a retailer that procures energy for 
distribution among consumers has been recently examined 
[15]. A large-scale day-ahead clearing scheme for the 
European market has been explored [19]. Mixed integer linear 
programming to minimize consumer price, while considering 
generator minimum up/down and ramp up/down times [23], 
and elsewhere, the presence of shiftable loads (i.e. loads which 
can be transferred across time slots) [22] have been 
investigated. Other supply side auctions make approximations 
in order to use linear programming [16]. One such study 
pertaining to the Brazilian energy grid, considers piecewise 
linear utility functions [16]. Linearizing the constraints is used 
within a game-theoretic equilibrium formulation [18]. A 
game-theoretic approach for decision making of storage units 
as seller agents in a smart grid for the maximum amount of 
energy to sell in the local market so as to maximize a utility 
that reflects the tradeoff between the revenues from energy 
trading and the accompanying costs has been studied [20]. A 
primal-dual approach to obtain optimal power flow is 
considered within a heterogeneous pricing framework [17]. 
Unfortunately, approaches where generating companies are 
involved in the bidding process are inapplicable within our 
context. Such auctions approach the problem primarily to 
establish a game-theoretic equilibrium, usually the Stackelberg 
equilibrium of a sequential game [15], [18], [21], [23].  
Demand side auctions with the optimal procurement of 
energy among multiple buyers is another area of research 
activity [3], [6], [24]-[27]. A simulation study using a Java 
based package (JADE) has been carried out [3]. Many of these 
studies investigate bidding across multiple time frames 
focusing on optimal operation of shiftable loads [21], [26]. An 
auction algorithm that incentivizes buyer participation is 
considered [25]. This study relies on historical data to penalize 
cheating behavior and ensure truthfulness. A limitation of this 
study is the underlying assumption of quadratic costs to make 
the problem formulation strictly convex.  
In recent years, double auctions that involve both buyers 
and sellers of energy, with the latter being PV-equipped units 
rather than generation companies have begun to be examined 
[4], [20], [28]-[31]. Unlike auctions between generation 
companies discussed previously that primarily aim to lower 
operation costs, the goal of these auction mechanisms is to 
optimize the distribution of energy within the customers in 
order to maximize the overall social welfare function (SWF) 
of the community, i.e. the aggregate utilities of all the units of 
the grid. One study that maximizes SWF, models its 
consumers as agents that collectively maximize the SWF [32]. 
This is an unrealistic approach for real world deployment 
where each agent adjusts is usage patterns only to maximize 
its individual payoff, i.e. the difference between its individual 
utility from consuming a certain amount of energy and the 
price it pays to procure the amount. Another study models the 
agents’ utilities as quadratic functions [33].  
A few recent studies have implemented the VCG 
mechanism for energy allocation and trade [24], [34]. This 
mechanism is used for energy allocation between multiple 
buying agents [24]. However the approach includes only a 
single seller; a bottleneck when the grid contains several PV 
equipped units. 
B. Contribution 
This research proposes a transactive energy double auction 
mechanism in the microgrid containing several domestic units 
acting as agents and with no restrictions on the number of PV-
equipped homes willing to sell energy to other units. In other 
words, the proposed auction is multi-agent, i.e. generalized 
enough to be applicable to systems involving multiple sellers 
as well as buyers, which are modeled as sets of distributed 
agents. In addition, it assumes that there exists a separate 
agent, the microgrid controller (MC), which contains enough 
computational capabilities to act as an impartial auctioneer. 
In contrast to most work on grid auctions which consider 
uniform pricing across all users in each time interval, this 
double auction uses price discrimination, where individual 
agents are priced separately. There are only a few papers that 
use discriminatory pricing [14], [17], [22]; unfortunately none 
are applicable to the present context.  
The proposed auction mechanism is weakly budget 
balanced, so that the total reimbursement provided to the 
sellers in exchange for energy never exceeds the total revenue 
obtained from the buyers.  
The payoff of each participating agent in the proposed 
auction is always guaranteed to not be lower than what its 
payoff would have been from non-participation in the trade. In 
other words, the auction is individually rational.  
The proposed mechanism allows separate and arbitrary 
utility functions for the agents, as long as they are 
monotonically increasing and concave. Moreover, the PV-
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equipped sellers have different maximum generation 
capacities. Although most proposed auction mechanisms make 
use of this information, in reality it must remain hidden from 
the MC. The proposed auction is able to attain the desirable 
outcome without the use of this information. Thus, the 
proposed auction is privacy-preserving. However, it must be 
noted that the auction may include an optional redistribution 
mechanism that may need access to such information [35], 
[36]. The redistribution option is included in the proposed 
mechanism in order to entertain the possibility of further agent 
coordination beyond the auction. This is when supply is high 
enough to meet the buyers’ demand, leaving room for further 
bargaining with the sellers, who then opt to impose their own 
arbitrary fairness criteria to redistribute the allocated supply 
determined by the auction. Such a situation may not arise 
when there are relatively few sellers, as the outcome of the 
proposed auction would involve selling their entire surplus 
energy.  
With a high proportion of sellers, the reasons for 
redistribution are manifold. Agents may have to operate within 
a legal reimbursement framework [37], resolve conflicts of 
interest [38]-[40], or other economic incentives [39], [41], 
[42]. The presence of storage devices either individually, or at 
a community level is another reason for further redistribution 
[38], [42]-[45]. Although, for simplicity, this paper considers 
fair redistribution only for the sellers, the approach can readily 
be extended to include the buyers.  
The proposed auction is SW maximizing for the set of 
buyers. When the supply is relatively small, the auction also 
maximizes the sellers’ SW. Furthermore, when no extraneous 
fairness criterion is applied, even with enough supply, the 
auction is still able to attain the efficient allocation among all 
agents. However, when there is a need for fair redistribution, 
the sellers’ SW is no longer at its maximum. This aspect of the 
proposed auction will be referred to as quasi-efficiency. The 
tradeoff between fairness and efficiency is quantified in terms 
of the price of fairness. The fair redistribution mechanism may 
be incorporated either in-auction, or as a second stage, post-
auction algorithm.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
framework of the auction, and its theoretical analysis are 
addressed in sections II and III. Fair redistribution is discussed 
in section IV. Simulation results are presented in section V 
while section IV concludes this research. 
II. AUCTION FRAMEWORK 
The microgrid consists of a set of buyer agents denoted as 𝒟 
and a set of seller agents denoted as 𝒮. At the beginning of the 
iterative auction, the MC, relays an initial price, which may 
reflect the actual price under non-isolated operation when the 
microgrid receives energy from the main grid. In order to 
ensure weak budget balance, the sellers can sell energy only at 
prices lower than or equal to 𝑝, whereas the buyers can 
procure energy at values higher than or equal to 𝑝. 
Each seller responds to the MC by letting the latter know of 
the amount of energy 𝑎𝑗 available for trade at a per unit 
price 𝑝𝑗 ≤ 𝑝. The energy 𝑎𝑗 can never exceed its total energy 
generation 𝑔𝑗. Subsequently the auction proceeds in an 
iterative manner as shown in Fig. 1. 
An iteration of the proposed auction mechanism involves 
the following exchange of information. The MC computes the 
volume of energy 𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑎𝑗  that it is willing to procure from 
each seller, and separately 𝑑𝑖 that it can deliver to each buyer. 
The microgrid controller optimization problem (MCOP) used 
to compute 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 for this task is addressed later. 
The buyer replies to the MC by placing a bid 𝑏𝑖 in monetary 
units that it is willing to pay for 𝑑𝑖 units of energy. Note that 
the condition 𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 for weak budget balance is considered 
only by the MC. simultaneously, the sellers return 𝑐𝑗, the per 
unit selling cost at which it is willing to supply the amount 𝑠𝑗 . 
As seen in Fig. 1, private information is not provided to the 
MC. The underlying social welfare optimization problem 
(SWOP) that ensures efficiency which incorporates both 
public and private data is discussed first.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic showing the flow of information between buying 
and selling agents and the MC. All parameters except those appearing 
within parenthesis are updated iteratively.  
A. Social Welfare Optimization Problem 
The SWF that is maximized by SWOP consists of the total of 
all buyers’ and sellers’ utilities (𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗), summed separately 
as shown below, where for notational convenience, the 
arguments 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 within the function Θ(∙) hereafter refer to 
the demand and supply allocations for buyers and sellers. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, 𝑠𝑗: 
Θ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗� = �𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖)
𝑖∈𝒟
+ �𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗�
𝑗∈𝒮
,         (1) 
subject to: 
𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖;    𝑖 ∈ 𝒟,                                                    (2) 
𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑎𝑗;       𝑗 ∈ 𝒮,                                                     (3) 
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
= �𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                                        (4) 
The first constraint in Eqn. (2) pertains to weakly budget 
balance for the buyers. The second constraint in Eqn. (3) 
ensures that the amount of energy that a seller exports to the 
microgrid never exceeds its declared availability. The last 
constraint in Eqn. (4) is present to ensure energy balance.  
For any given values of the bids 𝑏𝑖 and availabilities 𝑎𝑗 
given by the constraints in Eqns. (2) and (3), the SWOP 
defines a unique maximum at 𝑑𝑖∗, 𝑠𝑗∗. This follows from the 
fact that the SWOP objective function Θ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗� is the sum of 
strictly concave functions, and is also strictly concave with all 
its constraints being linear. The Lagrangian function 
corresponding to the SWOP can be written as, 
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ℒΘ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 , 𝜆𝑖 ,𝛼𝑗 , 𝜇� = Θ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗� + �𝜆𝑖(𝑝𝑑𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑖∈𝒟
 
+�𝛼𝑗�𝑠𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗∈𝒮
+ 𝜇 ��𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
−�𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝒮
� ,     (5) 
resulting to the following equilibrium conditions 
𝑝𝑑𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,                                                              (6) 
𝜆𝑖
∗(𝑝𝑑𝑖∗ − 𝑏𝑖) = 0,                                               (7) 
𝛼𝑗
∗�𝑠𝑗
∗ − 𝑎𝑗� = 0,                                                 (8) 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖∗) + 𝜆𝑖∗𝑝 + 𝜇∗ = 0,                                     (9) 
−𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
∗� + 𝛼𝑗∗ − 𝜇∗ = 0,                       (10) 
B. Microgrid Controller Optimization Problem 
In order to achieve the SWOP objective, MCOP is formulated 
as shown below. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, 𝑠𝑗: 
Φ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗� = �𝑏𝑖 log𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
−�𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝒮
,                          (11) 
subject to constraints in Eqns. (2), (3), and (4) which are 
restated below, 
𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ;    𝑖 ∈ 𝒟, 
𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑎𝑗;       𝑗 ∈ 𝒮, 
�𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
= �𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝒮
. 
  It must be noted that the MCOP formulation does not 
involve any hidden information from the buyers and sellers. 
For this reason, the objective that is maximized in MCOP does 
not involve the agents’ utility functions. Likewise, the second 
MCOP constraint uses 𝑎𝑗 instead of 𝑔𝑗, the latter being hidden 
from the MC. 
 The first term in the MCOP objective function in Eqn. (11), 
which pertains to the buyers, is adapted from the Kelly 
mechanism. This mechanism is originally proposed for single 
sided network auctions [46] which also does not require 
hidden data. The Kelly mechanism has been studied in the 
context of communication networks [47]-[49]. The authors 
have suggested the use of such an auction for use in microgrid 
energy trade [50]. However, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, its use in these auctions has not been examined so 
far elsewhere. 
 The second term in the MCOP objective function in Eqn. 
(11), the summation of the monetary payment 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗 given to 
each seller 𝑗 ∈ 𝒮, is the total sellers’ reimbursement by the 
MC. In order to accommodate any desired fairness criteria for 
the sellers, this term has been cast as a linear function. Post-
auction redistribution does not change the MCOP objective as 
long as the reimbursed amount and the total volume of energy 
transacted do not change during the redistribution stage. For 
the same reason, in-auction redistribution can be readily 
incorporated within the proposed mechanism, simply by 
adding a weighted third term to the objective function. 
For simplicity, this research takes into account only seller 
side fair redistribution. This setup may be viewed as one 
where the sellers have their own separate arrangement for fair 
redistribution [51]-[53], while the buyers are conventional 
consumers of energy. However, the framework can be readily 
extended to include coordinated buyers. This may be 
accomplished in a straightforward manner by incorporating 
another linear term in the MCOP objective, similar to the 
second but with opposite sign. 
The formulation in MCOP offers the flexibility of any 
redistribution scheme among the sellers using any fairness 
criterion as long as the total energy volume 𝑆 supplied by 
them remains equal to that delivered to the buyers, and the 
total monetary amount reimbursed to them is fixed. All such 
solutions satisfying these conditions for 𝑠𝑗 must be included in 
the set of optima of the MCOP. Fig.2 shows a graphical 
illustration of these considerations. Note that the optimum 
solution of the MCOP for the buyers,𝑑𝑖, is unique and 
coincides with that of the SWOP. The sellers’ unique optimum 
solution of the SWOP is also optimal for the MCOP. This 
solution can be made unique in the SWOP with the inclusion 
of a third convex term for fairness with a very small weight. 
Our simulations suggest that, when the auction proceeds 
without this third term, the auction arrives at the unique 
SWOP solution. 
The Lagrangian of the MCOP is defined as, 
ℒΦ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 , 𝛾𝑖 ,𝛽𝑗 , 𝜈� = Φ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗� + �𝛾𝑖(𝑝𝑑𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖)
𝑖∈𝒟
+ �𝛽𝑗�𝑠𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗∈𝒮
 
+𝜈 ��𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
−�𝑠𝑗
𝑗∈𝒮
� ,         (12) 
resulting to the following equilibrium conditions. 
𝑝𝑑𝑖
† ≤ 𝑏𝑖 ,                                                                (13) 
𝛾𝑖
†�𝑝𝑑𝑖
† − 𝑏𝑖� = 0,                                                (14) 
𝛽𝑗
†�𝑠𝑗
† − 𝑎𝑗� = 0,                                                  (15) 
𝑏𝑖
𝑑𝑖
† + 𝛾𝑖†𝑝 + 𝜈† = 0,                                             (16) 
−𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗† − 𝜈† = 0.                                             (17) 
C. Buyer Bidding 
The buyer bids to maximize its own payoff 𝜋𝑖. This can be 
formulated as another problem that is carried out locally by 
the agent.  
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑏𝑖: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) − 𝑏𝑖 .                                                  (18) 
Differentiating w.r.t. 𝑑𝑖, yields the following, 
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖) = ∂𝑏𝑖∂𝑑𝑖 .                                                        (19) 
Upon receiving 𝑑𝑖 from the MC, each buyer bids, 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖)𝑑𝑖 .                                                        (20) 
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D. Seller Bidding 
At the beginning of the proposed iterative auction, the seller 
declares its availability 𝑎𝑗.The seller communicates the cost 𝑐𝑗 
at which it is willing to deliver the volume 𝑠𝑗 of energy to the 
microgrid using the following problem formulation. 
Maximize w.r.t. 𝑐𝑗: 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗� + 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗 .                                      (21) 
When the seller does not overbid or underbid, this leads to 
the following cost updating rule. 
𝑐𝑗 =  𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗�.                                                  (22) 
The reason why the seller does not overbid or underbid is as 
follows. Let us consider the case where 𝑎𝑗 > 𝑠𝑗. Clearly the 
seller 𝑗 would not underbid by declaring a cost 𝑐𝑗 <
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗� since the monetary payoff 𝑐𝑗∆𝑠𝑗 obtained from 
this approach would be lower than the loss in utility 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 −
𝑠𝑗 − ∆𝑠𝑗�. On the other hand, overbidding is not an optimal 
strategy since it would make 𝑠𝑗 = 0. This can be seen by 
inserting the implicit constraint 𝑠𝑗 ≥ 0 to the MCOP problem. 
In this case, the Lagrangian in Eqn. (12) becomes 
ℒΦ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗 , 𝛾𝑖 ,𝛽𝑗 , 𝜈� + 𝜁𝑠𝑗 with the KKT conditions 𝜁 ≥ 0 and 
𝜁𝑠𝑗 = 0 in addition to those of the MCOP problem given by 
Eqns. (13) to (16) and with Eqn. (17) replaced with the 
equality  −𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜁 − 𝜈 = 0. Since  𝛽𝑗 = 0 when 𝑎𝑗 > 𝑠𝑗, 
the equality reduces to −𝑐𝑗 + 𝜁 − 𝜈 = 0. When the seller 𝑗 
does not overbid for a supply 𝑠𝑗 > 0, it is seen that 𝜁 = 0 and 
𝑐𝑗 = −𝜈. However if it overbids, then 𝑐𝑗 > −𝜈 whence 𝜁 > 0 
so that−𝑐𝑗 + 𝜁 − 𝜈 = 0, whence the new 𝑠𝑗 is forced to be 
zero, removing the seller from the auction. 
When 𝑎𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗 a similar argument with 𝜁 replaced with 
𝛽𝑗 + 𝜁, indicating that the seller will neither overbid nor 
underbid. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section establishes various desirable features of the 
proposed transactive energy double auction mechanism. 
Proposition-1 The allocation 𝑑𝑖
† of each buyer 𝑖 at the 
maximum of MCOP is equal to the corresponding maximum 
𝑑𝑖
∗ of SWOP, i.e. 𝑑𝑖
† = 𝑑𝑖∗.  
Proof:  From the assumption of strict concavity of any buyer’s 
utility 𝑢𝑖(∙), the function 𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖)𝑑𝑖  given by the buyers’ bid 𝑏𝑖 
in Eqn. (20) is strictly increasing.  Since the buyer’s bid 𝑏𝑖 
remains unchanged for both allocations 𝑑𝑖
† and 𝑑𝑖∗, 
clearly 𝑢𝑖′�𝑑𝑖†�𝑑𝑖† = 𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖∗)𝑑𝑖∗. Hence it follows that 𝑑𝑖† = 𝑑𝑖∗. 
■ 
Proposition-2 (Quasi-efficiency) The unique SWOP 
maximum at 𝑑𝑖∗, 𝑠𝑗∗ satisfies the KKT conditions of MCOP, so 
that, 
�𝑑𝑖
∗, 𝑠𝑗∗� ∈ argmax
𝑑𝑖,𝑠𝑗 Φ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗�. 
Proof: From Proposition-1, 𝑑𝑖
† = 𝑑𝑖∗. Consider the case with 
𝑠𝑗
† = 𝑠𝑗∗. Letting 𝛾𝑖† = 𝜆𝑖∗, 𝛽𝑗† = 𝛼𝑗∗, 𝜈† = 𝜇∗ and 𝑐𝑗 =
−𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
∗�, Eqn. (13) – Eqn. (17) are satisfied. The 
statement of Proposition-2 follows immediately. Note that 
there may exist other values of 𝑠𝑗
† ≠ 𝑠𝑗
∗ satisfying MCOP’s 
KKT conditions so that �𝑑𝑖∗, 𝑠𝑗†� ∈ argmax
𝑑𝑖,𝑠𝑗 Φ�𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗�. This 
extra degree of freedom offers the option of post-auction 
sellers’ redistribution. 
■ 
Proposition-3 (Weak budget balance) The proposed auction 
mechanism is weakly budget balanced.  
Proof: The net revenue remaining with the MC at the end of 
the auction is,  𝜋𝑀𝑀 = �𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
−�𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                          (23) 
The statement implies that 𝜋𝑀𝑀 ≥ 0. Hence the following 
inequality must be established, 
�𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
≥�𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                        (24) 
The net revenue obtained from the buyers is the bids 𝑏𝑖 
summed over all buyers, 𝑖 ∈ 𝒟. Using Eqn. (13) the following 
inequality holds, 
Fig. 2. Schematic showing the optima defined by the MCOP (left) and the SWOP (right). Both optima are unique with respect to the buyers 
and coincide (𝑑𝑖
†,𝑑𝑖∗). The SWOP’s unique sellers solution (𝑠𝑗∗) is also an optimal solution (𝑠𝑗†) of the MCOP although the MCOP admits 
other optima (𝑠𝑗𝑟) depending on the fairness criterion as long as the constraints shown are satisfied. 
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�𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
≥�𝑝𝑑𝑖
†
𝑖∈𝒟
.                                        (25) 
From the energy balance constraint given by Eqn. (4) at the 
equilibrium, Eqn. (25) can be written as follow,  
�𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
≥�𝑝𝑑𝑖
†
𝑖∈𝒟
= �𝑝𝑠𝑗†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                   (26) 
From Eqn. (22) it is seen that 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� = 𝑐𝑗. Since 𝑐𝑗 ≤ 𝑝, 
the inequality in Eqn. (26) can be rewritten as, 
�𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
≥�𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                    (27) 
Since  𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
†� = 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑠𝑗† ≤ 𝑎𝑗, under the assumption 
that the utilities 𝑣𝑗(∙) are concave, 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗� ≥ 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†�. 
Hence,   �𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑎𝑗�𝑠𝑗†
𝑗∈𝒮
≥�𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
†�𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
.              (28) 
From Eqn. (27), Eqn. (28), and Eqn. (22), 
�𝑏𝑖
𝑖∈𝒟
≥�𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
†�𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
= �𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗†
𝑗∈𝒮
.               (29) 
As ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮  is the reimbursement provided to sellers, the 
above inequality in Eqn. (29) implies that 𝜋𝑀𝑀 ≥ 0. 
■ 
Proposition-4 (Individual Rationality) The proposed auction 
mechanism is individually rational for all participating agents. 
Proof: This proposition will be established separately for the 
buyers and the sellers. Since the bidding strategy of every 
buyer 𝑖 is to maximize its payoff  𝜋𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) − 𝑏𝑖 where 𝑏𝑖 =
𝑢𝑖
′(𝑑𝑖)𝑑𝑖, upon termination of the auction, i.e. at equilibrium, 
it is evident that, 
𝑑𝑖
† = argmax(𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖′(𝑑𝑖)𝑑𝑖).                       (30) 
Whence it follows that, 
𝑢𝑖�𝑑𝑖
†� − 𝑢𝑖
′�𝑑𝑖
†�𝑑𝑖
† ≥ 𝑢𝑖(0).                                  (31) 
Since the utility of the buyer in the absence of any auction 
would have been 𝑢𝑖(0), that is the right hand side of the 
inequality in Eqn. (31), it is concluded that the auction is 
individually rational for the buyers. 
The payoff of each seller 𝑗 after the auction terminates is 
𝜋𝑗
† = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†� + 𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗†. Since at 𝑠𝑗†, from Eqn. (22), 𝑐𝑗 =
𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
†�, the payoff can be expressed as, 
𝜋𝑗
† = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†� + 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†�𝑠𝑗†.                     (32) 
Since the seller’s strategy is to maximize its payoff, 
clearly 𝜋𝑗† ≥ 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗�. From the Mean Value Theorem, there 
exists an 𝑟𝑗 ∈ �0, 𝑠𝑗†� such that, 
𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗� = 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†� + 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑟𝑗�𝑠𝑗†.               (33) 
From the concavity assumption of the utilities 𝑣𝑗(∙), 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 −
𝑠𝑗
†� ≥ 𝑣𝑗
′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑟𝑗� so that using Eqn. (32) and Eqn. (33), 
𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗
†� + 𝑣𝑗′�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗†�𝑠𝑗† ≥ 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗�.             (34) 
Since 𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗� represents the payoff of the seller 𝑗 before the 
auction, from Eqn. (34), clearly the auction is individually 
rational for the sellers. 
■ 
IV. FAIR REDISTRIBUTION 
This section addresses the problem of redistribution of the 
sellers’ allocations using a predetermined fairness criterion. 
The vast literature of computational mechanism design defines 
several fairness criteria [54]. However, many such paradigms 
require sellers’ hidden information, i.e. their utility functions, 
in their formulations, contradicting the underlying assumption 
of this research that the MC does not have access to the latter. 
 An in-auction implementation of any redistribution scheme 
can be readily accomplished by adding a fairness term to the 
MCOP objective weighted infinitesimally as 𝜂𝐹�𝑠𝑗𝑟�, 𝜂 ≪ 1, 
so that the auction’s properties outlined in the previous section 
are unaffected. Alternately, it can be implemented post-
auction as a second stage of the overall mechanism, which is 
considered here. The redistribution must be carried out in such 
a manner that the total amount that the MC provides as 
reimbursement, 𝑅, to the sellers must remain unchanged. 
Hence the redistribution algorithm follows the constraint 
below.  
𝑅 = �𝑐𝑗𝑟𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑗∈𝒮
= �𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                        (35) 
 In a similar manner, the total energy 𝑆 supplied by the 
sellers must remain fixed at that determined prior to 
redistribution. This is because, from energy balance in Eqn. 
(4), it must equal the total energy delivered to the buyers. 
Hence, 
𝑆 = �𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑗∈𝒮
= �𝑠𝑗†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                                 (36) 
Lastly, the amount that each seller is allocated after 
redistribution should not exceed its declared availability, so 
that, 
𝑠𝑗
𝑟 ≤ 𝑎𝑗;     𝑗 ∈ 𝒮.                                                        (37) 
As a representative scheme, we focus on the maximum 
entropy redistribution [54]. The fair redistribution 
mechanism’s using the maximum entropy criterion is given 
by, 
𝐹�𝑠𝑗
𝑟� = �𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑆
log 𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑆
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                             (38) 
With Eqns. (36) and (37) as constraints, maximizing 𝐹�𝑠𝑗𝑟� 
defines a fair redistribution optimization problem (FROP). The Lagrangian of the FROP is, 
ℒF�𝑠𝑗
𝑟 ,𝛽𝑗𝑟 , 𝜈𝑟� = �𝑠𝑗𝑟𝑆 log 𝑠𝑗𝑟𝑆
𝑗∈𝒮
+ �𝛽𝑗𝑟�𝑠𝑗𝑟 − 𝑎𝑗�
𝑗∈𝒮
 
+𝜈𝑟 ��𝑠𝑗𝑟 − 𝑆
𝑗∈𝒮
� ,          (39) 
with the following equilibrium conditions, 
𝛽𝑗
𝑟�𝑠𝑗
𝑟 − 𝑎𝑗� = 0.                                                       (40) 1 + log 𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑆
+ 𝑆𝛽𝑗𝑟 + 𝑆𝜈𝑟 = 0.                                 (41) 
This leads to solutions of the form, 𝑠𝑗𝑟 = 𝐾𝑒−𝑆𝛽𝑗𝑟, where 
𝐾 = 𝑆𝑒−1𝑒−𝑆𝜈𝑟 . For all sellers with 𝑠𝑗𝑟 < 𝑎𝑗, Eqn. (40) shows 
that 𝛽𝑗𝑟 = 0, whence 𝑠𝑗𝑟 = 𝐾. Since 𝛽𝑗𝑟 > 0 for those sellers 
that reach their maximum availabilities, the inequality 𝑠𝑗𝑟 < 𝐾 
holds. The redistributed allocations can be stated succinctly as, 
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the water filling algorithm. The leftmost 
column represents the total amount of supply which is redistributed 
to the columns in the right. In each column, the region shaded in 
blue (representing water), is the redistributed supply, 𝑠𝑗𝑟. 
Fig. 4.  Average buyer and sellers’ payoff participating in the 
auction for two cases of sellers with several buyers.  
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𝑟 = min(𝑎𝑗 ,𝐾),                                                  (42) 
with the aggregate energy term constraint leading to the 
expression, 
𝐾 = 𝑆 − � 𝑠𝑗𝑟
𝑠𝑗
𝑟=𝑎𝑗
.                                                 (43) 
This reformulation of the FROP leads to the well-known water 
filling algorithm shown in Fig. 3, and can be readily 
incorporated within the MC as an algorithm of computational 
complexity 𝑂(|𝒮| log|𝒮|). 
The sellers per unit energy costs can be implemented in 
various ways. For instance, uniform pricing leads to, 
𝑐𝑗
𝑟 = 1
𝑆
�𝑐𝑗𝑠𝑗
†
𝑗∈𝒮
.                                                (44) 
As mentioned earlier, this redistribution is accompanied by 
a loss in the overall SW that is expressed in terms of price of 
fairness, and is given by the following equation 
𝜅𝐹 = Θ�𝑑𝑖†, 𝑠𝑗†� − Θ�𝑑𝑖†, 𝑠𝑗𝑟�
Θ�𝑑𝑖
†, 𝑠𝑗†� .                        (45)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Several sets of simulations were performed to complement the 
theory. The auction in every case were initiated with a per unit 
market price of 𝑝 = 0.25. Utilities of the buyers and sellers 
were assumed to follow logarithmic saturation curves 
according to Eqns. (46) and (47), 
𝑢𝑖(𝑑𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖 log(𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑖 + 1),                                (46) 
𝑣𝑗�𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗� = 𝑥𝑗 log(𝑦𝑗(𝑔𝑗 − 𝑠𝑗) + 1).          (47) 
The quantities 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 and 𝑦𝑗 were randomly generated for 
each agent from a uniform distribution centered at unity. The 
generations, 𝑔𝑗, for the sellers were also drawn in at random, 
uniformly in the interval [2, 5].  
In order to show that every individual agent is better off 
participating in the auction, i.e. the auction is individually 
rational, extensive simulations were performed to get an 
average seller and buyers’ payoff under two cases of sellers 
with several cases of buyers as depicted in Fig.4. Notice that 
as the number of buyers in the auction increases, the average 
seller’s payoff increases while that of the buyer decreases. For 
a given number of buyers, the payoff of an average seller is 
higher in the case of 10 sellers than that of 15 sellers and the 
average payoff of a buyer is lower in the case of 10 sellers 
than that of 15 sellers. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To illustrate that the auction allows price differentiation, 
with 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖/𝑑𝑖 as the buyers’ per unit energy price, Fig. 5 and 
Fig.6 is presented to show the auction outcome for prices and 
allocations for two different cases of 5 sellers and 5 buyers 
(case I) and 5 sellers and 10 buyers (case II) representing two 
markets with low and high demand. Note that in case I all 
buyers pay the same minimum per unit price 𝑝 = 0.25 (Fig.5) 
and receive nonzero allocations (Fig.6) as the number of 
buyers are lower, whereas they are willing to pay different per 
unit prices more than 𝑝 = 0.25 in case II as demand is high 
due to high number of buyers. In case II, buyers who are 
willing to pay high per unit prices get non-zero allocations. 
For example, buyers 8, 9, and 10 that are not willing to pay 
higher per unit prices are allocated zero amounts. Note that in 
both cases, paying the highest per unit price does not mean 
getting the highest amount of allocation as every agents’ 
utility curve is randomly generated resulting to different 
marginal utilities. This means that different agents marginal 
utilities arrives saturation at different prices after which they 
are not willing to increase or decrease their bids as it is not 
profitable. 
For the sellers in case I however, except seller 1, all other 
sellers are allocated lesser supply than their declared 
availabilities due to low demand in the market, i.e. they end up 
selling less than their declared availabilities as listed in table I. 
This is because the buyers’ marginal utilities have reached 
down to saturation at the minimum buying price 𝑝 = 0.25 and 
they are not allowed to purchase more due to the weakly 
budget balance constraint 𝑝𝑑𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 . Notice that as there is 
more supply in the market in case I, the seller(s) with the 
lowest selling price, i.e. seller 1, gets to sell all its declared 
availability. Sellers 2 to 4 settle down at almost the same price 
as that of seller 1 and get to sell most of their declared 
availabilities whereas seller 5 does not sell any amount due to 
its high price.  For case II however, as the number of buyers is 
high, the sellers get to sell all their declared availabilities at 
different per unit prices with seller 5 selling at the highest per 
unit price. 
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Fig. 5. Buyers and sellers’ per unit prices 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗  for 𝑁𝑠 = 5,
𝑁𝑏 = 5 (case I) and 𝑁𝑠 = 5, 𝑁𝑏 = 10 (case II). 
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Fig. 6. Buyers’ allocation 𝑑𝑖  and sellers’ allocation 𝑠𝑗  for 𝑁𝑠 = 5,
𝑁𝑏 = 5 (case I) and 𝑁𝑠 = 5, 𝑁𝑏 = 10 (case II). 
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The MC’s revenue  𝜋𝑀𝑀   given by Eqn. (23) in case I is 
0.576 whereas it is 1.13 in case II showing the weakly budget 
balance property of the proposed double auction. This 
increase, can be readily seen through the change in buyers’ per 
unit prices from case I to case II when they increase from 5 to 
10 buyers. 
To present the effect of fair redistribution on the sellers’ 
side, additional details of the above two case along with the 
fair redistribution outputs for the sellers are provided in Table 
1. One issue that is solved through a fair redistribution can be 
observed in case I. Note that sellers 2, 3, and 4 have submitted 
the same per unit price with their maximum available 𝑎𝑗s for 
sale, however, they have been discriminated during allocation 
due to multiple optima in the MCOP’s objective as illustrated 
earlier in Fig.2. The water filling algorithm discussed earlier is 
used for this purpose to fairly redistribute the sellers’ 
allocation, 𝑠𝑗𝑟, with the new equally redistributed per unit price 
𝑐𝑗
𝑟. This clearly comes with a price, quantified earlier as the 
price of fairness in Eqn. (45), and is presented later in Fig.7. 
Notice that in case II, the distribution is already fair in 
allocations, i.e. 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗𝑟 , as sellers supply at their declared 
availabilities due to high market demand and redistribution 
yields the same amounts. However, sellers are price 
discriminated due to different marginal utilities, which can be 
redistributed using uniform pricing at sellers consent.  
 
Case 𝒋 𝒈𝒋 𝒂𝒋 𝒔𝒋 𝒄𝒋 𝒔𝒋𝒓 𝒄𝒋𝒓 
I 
1 4.204 2.177 2.177 0.171 1.790 0.172 
2 3.205 2.022 1.997 0.173 1.790 0.172 
3 3.141 2.196 2.092 0.173 1.790 0.172 
4 4.526 1.889 1.149 0.173 1.790 0.172 
5 2.155 0.254 0.000 0.229 0.254 0.172 
II 
1 4.526 3.101 3.101 0.158 3.101 0.180 
2 2.155 1.052 1.052 0.168 1.052 0.180 
3 4.204 1.112 1.112 0.206 1.112 0.180 
4 3.141 0.683 0.683 0.219 0.683 0.180 
5 3.205 0.470 0.470 0.229 0.470 0.180 
TABLE 1 Outcome of the auction pertaining to the sellers, before and 
after redistribution.  
The total sellers’ and total buyers’ welfare as well as the 
overall SW under 5 cases when no trade takes place, trade 
takes place, and when trade takes place and the MC 
redistributes the allocation for fairness purpose with the 
associated price of fairness, 𝜅𝐹  ,  is illustrated in Fig.7. Note 
that the SW is higher under trading than the case where no 
trade takes place, implying the benefit of the auction. 
Furthermore, the SW decreases after redistribution in the low 
demand case and is not affected in the high demand cases, 
where all sellers sell all of their declared availabilities. The 
Fig. 7. Social welfare Θ�𝑑𝑖
†, 𝑠𝑗†� under 5 different cases (case 
1: 𝑁𝑠 = 50, 𝑁𝑏 = 20, case 2: 𝑁𝑠 = 50, 𝑁𝑏 = 30, case 3: 𝑁𝑠 = 50,
𝑁𝑏 = 50, case 4: 𝑁𝑠 = 50, 𝑁𝑏 = 60, case 5: 𝑁𝑠 = 50, 𝑁𝑏 = 100)   
for no trading, trading, and trading with fair redistribution scenarios 
and the corresponding price of fairness 𝜅𝐹 in percent. 
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Fig. 8. Difference between SWs attained by SWOP and MCOP as a 
percentage of the latter for 4 different cases. 
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price of fairness is only non-zero when some of the sellers do 
not happen to sell their declared availabilities. 
Lastly, to show that the auction is efficient, i.e. the MCOP 
always attains the SW optimum, percent difference of the SW 
obtained by the MCOP to that of the actual optimum SW has 
been recorded during each iteration for 4 different cases and 
has been depicted in Fig.8. As can be seen, the percent 
difference drops to almost zero within several iterations. Note 
that the MCOP attains the actual SW optimum given that no 
in-auction fairness criterion is applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this research a double sided, weakly budget balanced, 
individually rational, and efficient transactive energy auction 
with user hidden information is presented for a microgrid. In 
the simulations reported earlier, an iteration of the double 
auction involved multiple steps of the underlying MCOP 
algorithm in order to ensure that the allocations were close 
enough to the optima, before the MC allows rebidding. A 
regularization term weighted by a vanishingly small amount 
was introduced to MCOP to let it converge to an optimum 
closest to the initial values. This was done to reduce the 
communication overhead which varies directly as the number 
of times the agents rebid. This approach differs from those 
taken elsewhere [IG+13]. The implicit assumption in this 
research is that the MC possesses enough processing 
capabilities to implement an optimization algorithm. However 
it should be noted that this approach can be implemented in a 
distribute manner by using methods such as the primal-dual 
interior point algorithm which may increase the 
communication steps while reducing the MC’s processing 
requirements [55]. 
 As mentioned earlier, it was observed that without in-
auction fairness, the MCOP always converged to the SWOP 
solution. This was shown in Fig.8 thru percent difference of 
the SW obtained by the MCOP compared to the actual SW. As 
theoretical issues pertaining to this observation have not been 
addressed in this research, the authors do not recommend this 
approach if no specific fairness criteria are needed. 
 Given that in double sided auctions, it is impossible to 
simultaneously achieve perfect efficiency, budget balance, and 
individual rationality with incentive compatibility[56], [57], in 
this study the viability of a double sided individually rational, 
weakly budget balanced, quasi-efficient  auction with agents 
not having to share private user information has been 
established. 
Although not included in our simulation results in the 
previous section, it is possible to apply water filling fairness 
criteria in-auction given that the agents’ strategies are as given 
in section II. However, theoretical investigations pertaining to 
generic in-auction fairness have not been studied.  
 Future research directions may be directed towards 
addressing the aforementioned issues. 
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